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1 Introduction
Uncertainty regarding the state of the world, or one’s preferences, underlies almost every economic envi-
ronment. In such settings, the agent might have the opportunity to actively explore in order to increase
her understanding. A typical example are the models of strategic experimentation [Robbins, 1952, Gittins
and Jones, 1979, Weitzman, 1979].1 When the agent takes an action, she does not only derive utility from
it, but also observes its consequence and gains better information pertaining to the underlying uncertainty.
It is intuitive, then, that the agent’s understanding (or lack thereof) is a function of her experience, and
subsequently, of her previous choices. We refer to such learning models as responsive. This paper provides
a behavioral foundation and identification techniques for a model of subjective and responsive learning.
Kreps [1979] and Dekel et al. [2001] put forth the canonical models of introspective uncertainty, which
identify the subjective uncertainty the decision maker (henceforth, DM) is facing regarding her own pref-
erences. Implicitly, these models are static and assume that all uncertainty is realized in a way that is
independent of the decision made by the agent. More recently, Takeoka [2007] and Dillenberger et al. [2014]
introduce (static) models of gradual learning, and Krishna and Sadowski [2014, 2015] provide the behavioral
foundation for a dynamic version of Kreps’ model that allows for tastes shocks. However, in these models,
as in Kreps, learning is not responsive: the arrival of information is irrespective of the consumption choices
made by the decision maker.
In many circumstances, such as a DM acknowledging the possibility of transient taste shocks, this is
perfectly reasonable. It is likely the DM’s choice of restaurant in the morning will not affect her ability
to discern her preference for fish and steak in the evening. However, if we consider the scenario of a
DM learning her ranking over as-of-yet unconsumed alternatives, unresponsive learning is inadequate. For
instance, imagine a novice researcher who is deciding on a project, but who is uncertain about her particular
talents. She obtains no information without experience; there is no “exogenous” signal that will indicate
her skill set. If she explores different research directions it will become apparent in which area she is more
talented.
Weitzman [1979] introduced a model that studies the optimal strategy of a decision maker in this situation.
The agent is engaged in a dynamic problem, trying to understand which project to invest in. Once she
explores a project, she knows exactly what that project yields; this may also convey some information about
other projects (in case the projects’ outcomes are correlated). At each point the agent has to decide whether
to keep exploring new projects or to commit to already explored and known projects.
We here study the decision theoretic aspects of responsive subjective learning. We follow the decision
theoretic learning literature and consider a dynamic constrained choice environment that extends the Krep-
sian framework. We provide the axiomatic foundation of a recursive utility function exhibiting subjective
responsive learning. Initially, just as in Kreps, there is uncertainty regarding preferences. Then, each period,
the DM jointly chooses a consumption outcome and a constraint for the following period so as to maxi-
mize her (current period) consumption utility and continuation value. The DM takes into account that her
choice of consumption today may teach her about her preferences, altering her information structure, and
accordingly, her preferences over future constraints. This representation captures the notion of responsive
learning by allowing the continuation utility function and information structure to explicitly depend on pre-
vious consumption choices. In this respect, our framework expresses the intertemporal tradeoff between the
consumption value of the choice today and its future informational value.
1See Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [2006] for a more recent survey.
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The decision maker’s subjective information structure changes only in response to her consumption
choices, in a manner similar to Weitzman [1979].2 In particular, our model considers a learning process
characterized in part by two constraints. First, the DM’s uncertainty regarding her ranking between a and
b is resolved once a and b are consumed. Second, if the DM is initially uncertain about her ranking between
a and b, then this uncertainty is not fully resolved unless she consumes outcomes over which her preferences
are perfectly correlated with a and b.
1.1 Results
The learning characteristics described above imply that preferences over already consumed goods are station-
ary. We begin the analysis by considering a somewhat simple framework combining flexibility and dynamics,
where the DM chooses between menus of streams of outcomes. In this framework we state Theorem 1,
showing that stationarity in the presence of flexibility is sufficient in order to uniquely identify the subjective
uncertainty. It is worth noting, uniqueness is achieved even though we do not consider environments with
risk, as is customary in the literature beginning with the uniqueness result provided by Dekel et al. [2001].
We then proceed to develop a complete model of learning in a framework of dynamic programing. In
this domain we state and prove Theorem 3, which is the axiomatization of responsive subjective learning.
In particular, we are able to elicit from behavior, not only (1) the set of states the DM believes possible, but
also (2) how the DM expects to learn conditional on a given path of consumption, and (3) how the decision
maker anticipates her preferences, over both future consumption and consequent information, will change
after learning any one of the pieces of information she believes possible. The elicitation of (2) and (3) are
novel.3 The main complication in accommodating responsive learning is identifying (3).
What makes this elicitation, and thus the axiomatization, inherently difficult, is that we are interested
in states that are not only subjective but also conditional. To understand the DM’s conditional preferences
for information, it is first necessary to be able to condition on the relevant (subjective) state. This is
not straightforward; the information structure is not directly observable as it is not incorporated into the
primitive. A contribution of this paper is developing the tools allowing the modeler to elicit preferences
conditional on subjective states.
Finally, Theorem 4 states that the subjective information structure (that is, the initial underlying un-
certainty and how the DM expects to learn as she consumes) in our model is uniquely identified. What
facilitates the identification in our environment is the dynamic and cumulative structure of learning. Our
framework elicits the DM’s (anticipated) understanding of uncertainty at multiple points in the learning
process. It is the stationarity of preferences over already consumed goods, and the consistency between
the multiple elicitations embodied by the cumulative nature of learning, that allows for such a result. The
examples in the subsequent section also expose how the dynamic aspect of choice uniquely determines the
information structure.
2In a more general bandit problem, when learning pertains to distributional parameters, our partitional learning seems
perhaps less realistic and noisy signals would be a natural generalization. It is also interesting to think about models that
combine responsive learning and exogenous information flows (the latter as in Dillenberger et al. [2014]). These models bear
important economic content, but their axiomatizations are far from being close to the one suggested here. For example, Piermont
and Teper [2016] axiomatize model of general responsive learning, albeit in a substantially different choice environment.
3The concept of conditional preferences of conditional preferences, etc., has been examined in other contexts. For examples
see, Gul and Pesendorfer [2005] and Siniscalchi [2011].
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1.2 Organization
The following section presents a simple model that explores how temporal aspects of choice could identify a
Krepsian state space, and discusses the main behavioral implication of learning through consumption in this
environment. The complete model is continued in Section 3, beginning with a conceptual discussion, then
introducing the framework in Section 3.1, and the axioms in Section 3.3. The main results are presented in
Section 4. In particular, the representation theorem is in Section 4.2 and the uniqueness result is discussed
and presented in Section 4.3. Section 5 contains a survey of the relevant literature.
Proofs omitted from the main text appear in the Appendix. In addition, Appendix C offers an alternative
axiomatization connecting our main axiom to the dominance relation of Kreps [1979]. Finally, Appendix D
discusses the additive specification of our general representation.
2 Flexibility with Stationary Preferences
In order to elucidate the mechanics behind our identification strategy and main axiom, we introduce the
following simple choice environment, which is the minimal intersection between preference for flexibility
and dynamic choice.4 The DM is associated with a preference over menus a` la Kreps, but menus contain
sequences of consumption objects, rather than static prizes.
Let X denote a finite set of consumption prizes, and let Σ “Ś8X denote the set of all infinite sequences
of consumption, with typical elements σ,ρ, etc. Let σn denote the n
th component of σ. For any a P X let a
denote the constant sequence a. The decision maker’s preference, ě, is therefore a subset of KpΣq ˆKpΣq,
where Kp¨q denotes the set of all non-empty (compact) subsets.5 Let W,W 1, etc. denote generic menus of
streams. Let SOrpXq denote the set of all strict orderings over X.6
Assume we can identify from flexibility the decision maker’s perception of uncertainty (regarding her
consumption preferences), that is, a subjective state space. In a departure from the standard Krepsian model,
we endow the state space with additional structure, capitalizing on the dynamic component. Specifically,
assume the state space, S, is composed of stationary preferences. That is, S is a subset of the possible
orderings of X, and the representations of these states are stationary discounted utility functions as in
Koopmans [1960].
Definition. A preference ě has a stationary sequential Krepsian representation if there exists a state
space S Ď SOrpXq with associated utility representations us : X Ñ R for each s P S, and a discount rate,
δ P p0, 1q, such that
UpW q ”
ÿ
sPS
«
max
σPW
8ÿ
n“1
δn´1uspσnq
ff
. (SSK)
represents ě.
There are two assumptions embodied in the formulation of Eq. (SSK). First, states are ordinal rankings
over X. This assumption is in the heart of the paper, and our techniques do not uniquely identify cardinal
4We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a formulation of our results in this simplified framework.
5We introduce concepts here with some imprecision, as the technicalities (such as defining relevant topologies) are thoroughly
discussed in Section 3.1, where the formal model is introduced.
6We assume throughout the state space in question does not admit indifferences (that is, states correspond to strict orderings
of X). This can be relaxed if we include a universal worst outcome, as discussed in Appendix B. But it clutters the otherwise
notationally simple proof of Theorem 1.
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rankings. Second, states and intertemporal tradeoffs are aggregated in an additive separable fashion. This
is merely for expositional purposes. The arguments will follow for every strictly monotonic aggregator.
The remainder of this section exhibits how the additional structure provided by the stationary dynamic-
component allows us to (1) uniquely identify the state space S, and (2) capture the gradual aspects of
learning through consumption.
2.1 Uniqueness of the State Space
It is well known, in the absence of additional structure, the Krepsian state space (over static consumption
alternatives) is not unique. This is shown in the following example borrowed from Dekel et al. [2001]. Let
X “ ta, b, cu. The DM ranks menus of X according to the number of elements they contain, that is,
ta, b, cu ą ta, bu „ tb, cu „ ta, cu ą a „ b „ c. (1)
The table below specifies two different state spaces representing the same preference as in Eq. (1).
X X
a b c a b c
s1 3 2 1 s
1
1 3 1 2
S s2 1 3 2 S
1 s12 2 3 1
s3 2 1 3 s
1
3 1 2 3
Notice that S and S1 induce different sets of ordinal rankings over X,
S “
$’&’%
a ąs1 b ąs1 c
b ąs2 c ąs2 a
c ąs3 a ąs3 b
, and S1 “
$’&’%
a ąs11 c ą
1
s11
b
b ą1s12 a ą
1
s12
c
c ą1s13 b ą
1
s13
a
.
Now, assume the DM’s entertains a stationary sequential Krepsian representation which induces the static
preferences outlined above. Clearly, by stationarity, her preferences over constant streams is dictated by Eq.
(1). However, by examining non-constant steams, the state space can be identified.
Consider the following menus of infinite streams:
W “ taaba, bcba, accau, W 1 “W Y aaca. (2)
Since every stream in W and W 1 provides a from period 4 onward, the DM’s preference between the menus
will be dictated by the initial 3 periods. First, assume the DM’s true model of uncertainty is embodied by
state space S. While it can be calculated via the functional representation that W „ W 1, there is a more
illuminating way of deriving this condition.
Notice, every stream in W and W 1 provides either a or b in the first period. Likewise, they all provide
either a or c in the second, b or c in the third, and a in any subsequent period. If the true state was s1 then
a is preferred to b, a to c and b to c, and therefore, aaba is strictly preferred to any stream that provides a
or b in the first period, a or c in the second, b or c in the third, and a from four onward. In particular, this
implies aaba is the argmax of
ř8
n“1 δn´1us1p¨q over W and W 1. Similarly, bcba maximizes
ř8
n“1 δn´1us2p¨q
and acca,
ř8
n“1 δn´1us3p¨q. Given this observation, it is immediate that the additional flexibility provided
by W 1 relative to W is of no benefit to the DM who entertains state space S. By the same argument, we can
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see that aaca is the (unique) optimal stream from W 1 if the true state is s11. Hence, a DM who entertains
S1 strictly prefers W 1 to W . Thus, by examining the preference over W and W 1 we can separate DMs who
entertain S from those who entertain S1, something that could not be done in the static environment.
In the static case, the differences between states may wash out in the aggregation process. But, when
dynamics are introduced, we can construct streams that are dominant for a given state by appropriately
selecting streams so that in each period the difference between all streams depends only on the preference
between two fixed consumption alternatives (in the example before, the first period is only a choice between
a or b). Then, due to stationarity, these pairwise preference can be aggregated to reveal the entirety of the
utility function, and hence the state space. Of course, this intuition generalizes to all stationary sequential
Krepsian preferences.7
Theorem 1. If ě admits a stationary sequential Krepsian representation, then the state space is unique.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume ě admits a stationary sequential Krepsian representation with state
spaces S and S1. Since S ‰ S1, there exists some state us¯ (w.l.o.g.) in S and not in S1. Let a P X be
an arbitrary consumption prize. Consider the set of all pairs of distinct elements of X, enumarated by
γ1 . . . γp|X|2 q. For any s P S define σ
s as
σsn “
$&%argmaxbPγn uspbq if n ď
`|X|
2
˘
a otherwise.
(3)
Let W “ tσs|s P Su and W 1 “ tσs1 |s1 P S1u. According to (SSK), when the state space is S, W YW 1 ąW 1,
but when the state space is S1, W YW 1 „W 1, a contradiction. 
2.2 Strategic Planning
This section uses the above framework to explicate strategic planning, the key behavioral restriction under-
lying the process of learning through consumption. The above identification result allows us to infer what
the DM anticipates learning by the time when she must choose out of the menu, but does not capture the
responsive aspect of learning through consumption. Since the process of interest is dictated by previously
consumed outcomes, we here consider a family of SSK representations which are indexed by possible explo-
ration histories (i.e., subsets of X which were previously explored by the DM). For any non-empty h Ď X,
ěh expresses the flexibility the DM prefers when she will have the opportunity to explore elements in h; this
captures the information she expect to learn from her exploration of h.
The preference relations těhuhĎX give rise to an associated family of SSK state spaces, tShuhĎX . Recall,
the learning process of interest is principally characterized by the constraint that the DM’s uncertainty is
resolved by (and only by) learning her ordinal ranking between outcomes. Since the DM anticipates all
uncertainty to be resolved after consuming every alternative, the state space SX represents the DM’s under-
standing of the entire space of uncertainty. The same idea applies to every exploration history. Following
the exploration of h, the DM can distinguish the events in SX described by her ranking of the alternatives
h, which she has consumed. So, the learning through consumption process implies the family of state spaces
tShuhĎX should correspond to a set of partitions, tPphquhĎX , of SX . In particular, a cell in the partition
Pphq is formed by the states (in SX) which coincide on their ranking over h.
7Kochov [2015] also uses the temporal aspect of choice problems, in lieu of lotteries, to facilitate identification. He identifies
the set of probability measures in a Max-Min environment.
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For example, a DM is considering four consumption objects: two laptops: Mac (m) and PC (p), and two
phones: iPhone (i) and Android (a). Imagine, the DM believes that the true uncertainty is captured by the
state space
SX “
$’’&’’%
m ą1‹ p ą1‹ i ą1‹ a,
m ą2‹ p ą2‹ a ą2‹ i,
p ą3‹ m ą3‹ a ą3‹ i,
(4)
where ąi‹ is associated with the state si‹ . The preference relation ěmp represents the DM’s preference over
menus of sequences when she is to consume m in the first period, p in the second, and then choose a sequence
from the menu after realizing her preference over m and p. As such, the DM’s state space Smp will have two
states corresponding to the events in the partition
 ts1‹ , s2‹u, ts3‹u(. Perhaps:
Smp “
$&%m ą1 p ą1 i ą1 a,p ą2 m ą2 a ą2 i.
Similarly, ąi is associated with the state si. Notice, state s1 is the DM’s aggregated preference in the event
ts1‹ , s2‹u, and s2 her aggregated preference in event ts3‹u. Naturally, since the event ts1‹ , s2‹u is defined by
“m is preferred to p”, then m ą1 p. Likewise p ą2 m; in fact, since ts3‹u contains only one state, ě2“ě3‹ .
Conversely, imagine that following the consumption of m and p the state space was S1mp “ SX – ts1‹u, ts2‹u, ts3‹u(. In this case, after the DM consumes m and p she expects to learn her preference between
a and i even when she learns “m is preferred to p”. In this example, this learning cannot be rationalized
by a responsive model, as the information she expects to learn is uncorrelated with her preference over her
previous consumption. In the event “m is preferred to p”, the DM’s ability to distinguish her preferences
over a and i (i.e., between the events ts1‹u and ts2‹u) must be predicated on information unrelated to m
and p.
It is worth clarifying: Smp is her perception of what uncertainty will be resolved by consuming m and p,
and therefore its states correspond to events which can be distinguished given her experience. Thus, while
she believes the true uncertainty to be represented by SX , after mp she could not distinguish the events
ts1‹u and ts2‹u. Her preference for flexibility would identify a state space resembling Smp (by aggregating
states s1‹ and s2‹).
This restriction, that the state spaces can be associated with a partitional structure, corresponds to the
behavioral restriction embodied by strategic planning. Strategic planning dictates that the flexibility desired
after h (i.e., by ěh) is determined completely by the DM’s ranking over h. Going back to the example,
notice,
ta, iu ąmp a and ta, iu ąmp i.
That is, the DM prefers flexibility to choose her phone after seeing her preference over laptops. However,
the DM will exhibit the rankings
tpa,miu „mp tpa,mi, pi,mau,
which implies that the DM does not require the flexibility to choose the phone and laptop separately; she is
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ta, bu ta, cu tb, cu σ
a 9ąb 9ąc a a b aab
a 9ąc 9ąb a a c aac
b 9ąa 9ąc b a b bab
b 9ąc 9ąa b c b bcb
c 9ąa 9ąb a c c acc
c 9ąb 9ąa b c c bcc
Figure 1: Example of Σphq with h “ ta, b, cu
happy to jointly make this decision. Of course, this is because her preference over phones (as reflected by
Smp after consuming mp) is completely determined by her preference over laptops; when choosing from the
menu tpa,mi, pi,mau, the choice between m and p in the first period perfectly reveals the state in Smp.
This intuition is generalized, capitalizing on our ability to identify states in a manner similar to the proof
of Theorem 1. So, let Γphq denote the set of all pairs of distinct elements of h, enumerated as γ1 . . . γp|h|2 q.
Then, for any s P SOrphq define σs P hp|h|2 q as
σsn “ argmax
bPγn
uspbq, (5)
where us is any utility representation of s. Let Σphq “ tσs|s P SOrphqu.
For a general exploration history h, the elements of Σphq represent the possible strict rankings over the
outcomes comprising h. To make this clear, consider the following example. Let h “ ta, b, cu, and take
the following ordering over doubletons: ta, bu, ta, cu, tb, cu. Then, Σpta, b, cuq “ taab, aac, bab, bcb, acc, bccu.
Each of the 6 sequences in Σpta, b, cuq corresponds to one of the six possible strict rankings 9ą over ta, b, cu
as shown in Figure 1.
If the DM knows her ranking of the elements of h, then there is a unique sequence in Σphq that maximizes
that ranking. Indeed, notice that all the sequences in Σpta, b, cuq give either a or b in period 1, either a or
c in period 2, and either b or c in period 3. If a 9ąb 9ąc, the consumption stream aab dominates all the other
consumption streams in Σpta, b, cuq by period-by-period comparison, and hence is most preferable among
Σpta, b, cuq. Similarly, if a 9ąc 9ąb, aac is most preferable among Σpta, b, cuq, and so on. Because the comparison
is through period-wise dominance, consumption streams in Σphq can be ranked only based on single-period
rankings without knowing any additional properties regarding intertemporal tradeoffs like discount factors
or elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Clearly, there is a bijective relation between Σphq and SOrphq, since if the DM knows her ranking over h,
then there is a unique sequence in Σphq maximizes that preference. Moreover, there is an injective relation
between Pphq and SOrphq, since each element of the partition corresponds to a ranking over h. Strategic
planning provides the link between these relations, ensuring that the identified state space is consistent with
such a partition.
Definition. Let W Ă Σ be a finite collection of sequences. Then pW : Σphq Ñ W is an SSK strategic
plan if ď
σPΣphq
σpW pσq „h
ď
σPΣphq
ď
ρPW
σρ
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In the example above, m ÞÑ i and p ÞÑ a constitutes a strategic plan for W “ ti,au. The intuition for
the general definition is the same. A strategic plan takes flexibility inherent in making two separate choices
(i.e., from Σphq and from W ) and reduces it to a single choice (from Σphq). From the identification of Σphq
and SOrphq, the existence of a strategic plan (for every finite collection, W ) implies that the resulting SSK
state space Sh can be identified with the partition Pphq.
2.3 The Limitation of the Simple Model
The existence of a strategic plan for all exploration histories and all finite menus is necessary for a model of
learning through consumption, but alone it is insufficient to guarantee any consistency between the identified
state spaces. Our interpretation is that preference for flexibility arises from a cumulative learning process,
so the DM’s perceptions of uncertainty after different histories all arise from a single ex-ante view of what
information might be realized. In the discussion above, this consistency is informally implied by our assertion
that Sh corresponds to a cell in the partition Pphq. This implication is informal as one needs to show how
the different states in a cell of Pphq are aggregated to the proper state in Sh.
What seems to be a technical issue stems from a more conceptual problem. Due to the nature of the SSK
state spaces, the modeler does not have access to how the DM expects to continue to learn –given the event
“m is preferred to p,” what does the DM expect to learn from further consuming a and i? Given exploration
history h, we can only identify the DM’s anticipated change in her preference over consumption streams, but
not her preference over further information –a key aspect of exploration and exploitation models. This would
require the DM to be able to capitalize on further information, providing flexibility in multiple periods.8
To illustrate this point, recall the example in the previous subsection. The DM has in mind a subjective
state space SX as given by (4). The responsive learning implies that after exploration history mp, the
DM anticipates an information structure given by the partition tts1‹ , s2‹u, ts3‹uu. However, since only the
aggregated state matters for evaluating consumption streams, what can be identified within the simple model
is not this partition itself but the state space Smp, elements of which are presumably obtained by aggregating
different states in a cell of the partition.
Given Smp, it is easy to see the DM will display the following indifference
tpaia,maiiu „mp tpaia,maii, paii,maiau.
When trees of menus (i.e., compound menus) are taken as choice objects, the DM’s uncertainty conditional
on a cell of the partition can be identified. For example, the compound menu tpaia,maita, iuu allows the
DM to delay a decision between a and i until after consumption a and i. If the DM anticipates, after learning
ts1‹ , s2‹u, that she will further learn which state in the cell is true, she would desire this flexibility. Thus,
tpaia,maita, iuu ąmp tpaia,maii, paii,maiau.
This ranking reveals that after exploration history mp, the DM expects residual uncertainty about the
ranking between a and i even after she learns “m is preferred to p”. We can deduce that her information
structure would look like tts1‹ , s2‹u, ts3‹uu. Such an inference is not possible within the domain of the simple
model.
8 The simplest enrichment, however, looking at streams of menus, is not sufficient. Streams of menus do not allow the DM’s
(ex-ante) preference for flexibility in later periods to depend on the information that arrived in earlier periods: only aggregated
preference can be identified. The needed domain is one in which the choice objects are trees of menus.
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In the subsequent sections we develop a model of dynamic programming that will fully capture the
features of learning through consumption as a model of exploration and exploitation.
3 A Complete Model of Learning Through Consumption
To better understand the connection between the snapshots of the DM’s information structure (i.e., tShuhĎX)
and the learning process which underlies it, we appeal to a richer, recursive model. The objects of choice are
Infinite Horizon Choice Problems (IHCPs) (formally constructed in section 3.1) and are generically denoted
by z, w etc, with Z the set of all IHCPs. Each IHCP z induces a menu Mpzq Ď X ˆ Z. Each element,
i P Mpzq, is a pair: a consumption today, ai P X, and a continuation problem tomorrow, zi P Z. Since
zi is also an IHCP, we can write it too as a menu of pairs of consumptions and continuation problems:
zi “ tpbj , zjqujPMpziq. It is helpful to think of an IHCP as an infinite tree, where each node is an IHCP and
the branches emanating from a node correspond to the elements of the induced menu, see Figure 2. The
menu induced by z, Mpzq, is the set of branches emanating from from z.
Since an IHCP is a tree of menus, at the beginning of each period, the DM faces a menu, Mpzq, from
which she must jointly choose that period’s consumption and the next periods IHCP. As such, she can exhibit
a preference for flexibility at each period, and thus, she can capitalize on her information at multiple points
in time.
z
a
b
b
w
w
v
Figure 2: Representation of an IHCP z as a tree of constraints. Note that in the
first period, two pairs offer w as the next period IHCP and two pairs offer b as
the consumption prize.
Consider a DM who is ranking contingent IHCPs to be consumed after exploration history h. She is
aware that when she chooses a path of consumption from an IHCP she will have the information structure
induced by h: the partition Pphq. This imparts an ex-ante preference for flexibility. Hence her value for
IHCPs after history h, Uh, takes the form,
9
Uhpzq “ φh
`
max
iPMpzq
F ruP paiq, UhYai|P pziqsPPPphq
˘
, (6)
where φh (that aggregates information dependent utilities) and F (that aggregates consumption and explo-
ration utilities) are strictly increasing aggregators.
The DM is able to make distinct choices contingent on the resolution of uncertainty embodied by the
information provided by the consumption of h and a. As the DM consumes, both the information structure
and the conditioning events evolve. The information structure is refined, Pphq Ñ PphYaq, as a direct result
9When consumption experience increases, the expected information structure becomes weakly finer: Pph Y aq is a finer
partition than Pphq. Moreover, PphY a|P q stands for the partition of the cell P generated by the consumption of hY a.
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of the addition of new elements to the history. In turn, the conditioning events become more informative,
P Ñ P 1, as the DM utilizes this available information in each period’s consumption choice.
Note that the continuation value does not take the same form. This is because, when choosing from
Mpzq she utilized her available information, so subsequent choices will take this into account. Hence, any
future choice must be conditioned on being in the true cell of the partition of Pphq. The functional, Uh|P ,
with information structure Pphq and conditioning event P P Pphq, takes the following Learning Through
Consumption functional form:
Uh|P pzq “ max
iPMpzq
F ruP paiq, UhYai|P pziqs, (LTC)
where the aggregation property of information dependent utilities takes the form uP “ φh1|P puP 1qP 1PPph1|P q
for every P P Pphq and h1 Ą h.
3.1 Framework
Let X be a finite set, with some metric dX . The set X represents everything that the decision maker could
consume (in a given period) and is fully observable. Each period the decision maker consumes one element
of X; let lowercase letters near the beginning of the alphabet (i.e., a, b, c) denote elements of X. For any
metric space, Y , let KpY q denote the set of all compact subsets of Y endowed with the Hausdorff metric.
We can construct the set of IHCPs in a manner similar to Gul and Pesendorfer [2004]. A one period choice
problem is a collection of alternatives from which the DM must choose –an element of KpXq. The set of all
one period choice problems, Z1, corresponds to the set of all compact subsets of X (i.e., KpXq).
An N period choice problem is a collection of pairs consisting of an alternative to consume and an N ´ 1
period choice problem. As such, the set of all N period choice problems, ZN , corresponds to KpX ˆZN´1q.
Note that compactness is defined in the product topology over X ˆ ZN´1 (where the topology of ZN´1 is
itself the product topology defined similarly). We can continue this iteration so as to define Zˆ “Ś8n“1 Zn.
We will restrict ourselves to the set of consistent elements of Zˆ, where z P Zˆ is consistent if for all n,
projZn´1zn “ zn´1 (where, proj is the projection mapping). Let Z Ă Zˆ be the restriction of Zˆ to consistent
elements. Call Z the set of Infinite Horizon Choice Problems. The primitive of the model is a preference
relation, ě, over elements of Z.
A member of Zˆ specifies an n-period problem for each n P N. The restriction of consistency ensures that
for each z P Z, and each m,n P N with n ą m, the specified n-period problem is an extension of the specified
m-period problem. That is, the first m-periods of the n-period problem coincide with the m-period itself.
Intuitively, this allows us to view each z P Z as an infinite period problem, by considering the sequence of
arbitrarily large, and expanding, finite period problems.
Of course, an infinite period problem will have a particular recursive property: the objects assigned after
the first period consumption will themselves be infinite period problems. This is substantiated by the fact
that there exists a canonical homeomorphism between Z and KpX ˆ Zq.10 By the identification between
10This result can be seen as a special case of the similar claim in Gul and Pesendorfer [2004], where we restrict the domain
at each iteration to degenerate lotteries. More constructively, it is easy to check that the following functions, I and M , are well
defined, continuous, and inverses of one another:
Define I0 : KpX ˆ Zq Ñ Z1 via the following map: I0pyq “ ta P X|pa, zq P y for some z P Zu. Then for each n ě 1, define
In : KpX ˆ Zq Ñ Zn`1 via the following map: Inpyq “ tpa, znq P X ˆ Zn|pa, zq P y for some z P Z such that projnpzq “ znu.
And let I : KpX ˆ Zq Ñ Z defined by Ipyq “Ś8n“0 Inpyq.
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Z and KpX ˆ Zq, we can describe each z as a collection in X ˆ Z: z “ tpai, ziquiPMpzq for some index set
Mpzq. We call Mpzq the menu induced by z.
3.2 Notation
Tree-amalgamating operations. For any two IHCPs, z, w P Z, we can define their union, pz Ywq as the
IHCP such that Mpz Y wq “Mpzq YMpwq. See Figure 3.
z1
a
b
w
w
w1
b
b
w
v
z1 Y w1
a
b
b
w
w
v
Figure 3: Representation of IHCPs z1 and w1, and their union z1Yw1. Note, pb, wq
is available both in z1 and w1 and appears only once in z1 Y w1; and, z1 Y w1 “ z
as shown in Figure 2.
We will refer to (finite) collections of IHCPs with capital letters near the end of the alphabet (W,V ).
In an abuse of notation, we will identify each collection of IHCPs with the IHCP that is the union of its
elements: the collection W can be treated as the IHCP: W “ ŤwPW w. With this identification, any IHCP,
z, that does not have a degenerate first period choice, could also be described as a (not necessarily unique)
collection of smaller IHCPs. As such, the distinction between collections and individual IHCPs is not strict
(i.e., for every W there is an associated w) but the notation will be helpful later.
Tree-traversal operations. These notations identify particular branches of a given IHCP. For a given,
z P Z, we can define the set of all feasible (decision) sequences of length n, npzq. Given z, a decision is
feasible if it is an element of the implied menu: i P Mpzq (with the corresponding continuation tree zi). A
feasible decision sequence of length n, for IHCP z, is a sequence of n choices, where the mth choice is a
feasible choice out of the continuation tree implied by the pm´1qth choice and the first choice feasible out of
Mpzq. In other words, each decision sequence corresponds to a particular path up the tree. We will denote
such sequences with lower case greek letters: σ, ρ, etc. See Figure 4.11
Tree-pruning and concatenation operations. For any finite choice problem, A P Zn, we can define
Az as the IHCP that assigns z as a continuation tree to every feasible decision sequence of length n (contained
in A). In particular, az is the IHCP which begins with consumption of a P X followed by the IHCP
z. Likewise, for some finite sequence of consumption, σ P ŚNn“1X, σz is the IHCP which begins with
consumption σ followed by z.
For some z, let σ be a finite, feasible decision sequence. Then we can define zσ as the continuation tree
after choosing σ. From this, we can define z´σw as the IHCP that agrees with z everywhere but after the
feasible sequence σ, where zσ is replaced by w. See Figure 4. Similarly, for an IHCP z, a finite feasible
Now define M0 : Z Ñ KpXq via M0pzq “ z1. For each n ě 1 and a P M0 define Ma,n : Z Ñ KpZnq via Ma,npzq “
tz1n P Zn|pa, z1nq P projn`1pzqu. Let Mapzq “
Ş
ně0tz1 P Z|projnpz1q “ Ma,npzqu. Finally, define M : Z Ñ KpX ˆ Zq as
Mpzq “ tpa, z1q|a PM0pzq and z1 PMapzqu.
11In Figures 2-5, we have suppressed the Mpzq indexing notation in order to make the illustrations cleaner (both visually and
conceptually). It is worth noting that the true description of σ in Figure 4 is actually σ “ b2a11 (under the obvious index) so
as to distinguish it from a different path (for example if a1 was available in v).
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za
b
b
w
w
a1
b1
c1
z1
w1
v1v
Figure 4: The red path corresponds the the feasible sequence σ “ ba1, and zσ “ z1.
The IHCP z´σz2 would be identical to the above except with z1 replaced with z2.
decision sequence σ, and a finite choice problem A, let z´σAzσ be the IHCP in which, if the path σ was
chosen then the continuation problem is Azσ. That is, z´σ was concatenated with Azσ. Finally, we denote
by z´nAzn the IHCP resulting from the concatenation of z´σ with Azσ for every feasible sequence of length
n (that is, σ P npzq), see Figure 5.
z
a
b
b
A
A
A
w
w
v
Figure 5: The IHCP z´nAzn for n “ 1.
Finally, the use of bold lettering signifies degenerate IHCPs – predetermined sequences of consumption.
So for each σ P Ś8n“1X, we identify σ as the IHCP such that there is only one feasible decision sequence
of any given length, where the unique sequence coincides with the first n terms of σ. The above notational
conventions are summarized in Table 6.
Notation Meaning Notes
a, b, c Single period consumption prizes
z, w, v IHCPs
σ, ρ, pi Streams of consumption
Finite unless otherwise noted,
also represents feasible sequences
when subscripted as in zσ or z´σ
W,V Collections of IHCPs
Identified with their unions (and
so also IHCPs)
Az
A finite choice problem followed
by an IHCP
σ,ρ Degenerate IHCPs
Specify a predetermined (infi-
nite) sequence of consumption
Figure 6: Table of notational conventions.
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3.3 Axioms
3.3.1 Exploration Histories
At any given node in an IHCP we can define the set of consumption prizes that must have been consumed to
reach that node. Formally, define the exploration history at a node as the support12 (in X) of the (unique)
decision sequence that leads to that node. In other words, the exploration history does not remember the
index but only remembers the consumption (i.e., ignores the menu from which the consumption was chosen,
the order of consumption, and the number of times a prize has been consumed). We assume as a structural
“axiom 0” that the preference for continuation trees depends only on the history.
[A0: Only Histories Matter (Hst)]. For all z, w P Z and σ, ρ such that supppσq “ supppρq
σz ě σw ðñ ρz ě ρw
This allows us to simplify notation with the following abuse, letting h denote both a subset of X (the
set of previously consumed outcomes), and any specified sequence consisting of exactly those elements. As
such, we can define the history dependent preferences.
Definition. For each h, let ěh denote the projection of preferences after exploration history h defined by
z ěh w ðñ hz ě hw.
3.3.2 Ex-ante Preferences
We assume that the following axioms hold for all h. To achieve the basic utility structure we have that ě is
a continuous weak order:
[A1: Continuous Weak Order (Ord)]. The binary relation ě is a continuous weak order.
The first substantive axiom governs the learning process. We are assuming the DM’s preference does
not change unless she learns something (or, more accurately, anticipates learning). If the decision maker
has already consumed a then consuming a again will not teach her anything new, and her preference will
not change. Hence, we postulate that consuming items that are already in the exploration history will not
change her preferences.
[A2: H-Stationarity (Sta) ]. For any z, w, v P Z, ρ feasible for v, and n ą 0, if A,B are finite decision
problems:
1. if supppAq Ď hYŞσPnpzqYnpwq σ, then z ěh w ðñ z´nAzn ěh w´nAwn; and
2. if supppBq Ď hY ρ, then v´ρBtz Y wu „h v´ρtBz YBwu.
Sta has two components. First, (1) dictates that the decision maker does not change her preference
when consuming prizes she has already consumed. The motivation for this is straightforward, as the only
mechanism of learning is consumption of new prizes. The formal restriction states that if consuming the
12The support of a (finite) decision problem, and in particular a feasible sequence, is all the elements of X that can be
consumed in that problem.
14
decision problem A is unavoidable (i.e., it will be reached on every path of consumption after n periods) and
if all of the consumption prizes in A will already have been consumed (i.e., supppAq Ď hYŞσPnpzqYnpwq σ),
then the inclusion of A will not influence the DM’s preferences between z and w. A special case of (1) states
that if supppAq Ď h then z ěh w ðñ Az ěh Aw, which is reminiscent of the canonical stationarity axiom
of Koopmans [1960] (applied to previously consumed prizes). We require the more general formulation to
enforce that preferences remain stationary (with respect to previously consumed prizes) even as they change
(with respect to novel prizes).
Second, (2) dictates that the decision maker is indifferent to making a choice before or after the consump-
tion of previously consumed prizes. In general, the decision maker would prefer to delay making decisions,
as it would allow her to condition on more information. However, if in the interim the decision maker learns
no new information (because she consumes no novel prize), then she is just as well off making the decision
now.
Without learning, the union of two IHCPs would never be preferred to both; the decision maker knows
already which stream she would choose and would (weakly) prefer the menu that contained this stream. When
the decision maker anticipates learning then flexibility is strictly beneficial, as it allows her to capitalize of the
information she learns. Flexibility allows the DM to make different decisions conditional on the realization
of the learning process.
[A3: Preference for Flexibility (Flx)]. For all v, z, w P Z and for all feasible decision sequences
given v:
v´σpz Y wq ěh v´σz
This axiom looks slightly different than its canonical form. We require that flexibility is not disadvan-
tageous, not only at time zero, but also on any branch of any IHCP. Because we have relaxed stationarity
it is not enough to impose that z Y w ěh z since this could be true for initial choices but be violated for
continuation problems on a particular branch of some IHCP.
Next, we need some notion that the DM is consistent in how she expects to learn. The DM’s (time 0)
anticipated preference at h1 should be the same as how she anticipates (at time 0) anticipating (at h Ă h1)
her preference at h1. In words, breaking her expected learning process into separate pieces should not affect
the final preference.
[A4: Consistent Flexibility (Con)]. For every h1 Ě h, and set of sequences contained in the history,
A ĎŚNi“1 h, and functions, f, g : AÑ Z thenď
σPA
σpifpσq „h
ď
σPA
σpitfpσq Y gpσqu
ðñď
σPA
σfpσq „h1
ď
σPA
σtfpσq Y gpσqu
for all pi such that hY pi “ h1.
The DM must choose out of A today, which will determine the IHCP she will receive after consuming
pi which will create the exploration history h1. If she sees no benefit to the additional flexibility provided
by the assignment g, then it is because under all possible realizations of uncertainty brought about by her
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consumption of h1, the IHCP assigned by f is preferred to that by g. But if this is the case, there must be
no benefit to flexibility according to the preference ěh1 .
3.3.3 Strategic Planning
Our next axiom generalizes the notion of an SSK strategic plans to the setting where choice objects are
IHCPs. The motivation is identical as before: to ensure that the outcome of prior actions (i.e., the rankings
of consumed goods) is a sufficient statistic to predict future choice. If the decision maker is told (ex-ante)
the realization of her ranking over the elements of some exploration history h, she can exactly predict her
(interim, after history h) preference over all other IHCPs. She has no value in waiting to make a decision
because any information she might learn is contained by the information about her ranking over h.
We construct the choices that will correspond to the ordinal rankings over the exploration history as in
section 2.2; recall the following bit of notation:
Definition. For every h, such that |h| ě 2, let Γphq denote the set of all pairs of distinct elements of h,
enumerated as γ1 . . . γp|h|2 q. Then, For any s P SOrphq define σ
s P hp|h|2 q as
σsn “ argmax
bPγn
uspbq, (7)
where us is any utility representation of s. Let Σphq “ tσs|s P SOrphqu. For h with |h| “ 0, 1, let Σphq “ H.
Recall, if the DM knows her ranking over h, then there is a unique element of Σphq that maximizes that
preference. So, for any collection of IHCPs W Ď Z, the DM chooses a distinct alternative from the IHCP
tσW |σ P Σphqu
according to a distinct ranking over h. Therefore, if we can observe a subsequent choice from W following
a particular consumption stream in Σphq, we can infer that such a choice is based on preference conditional
on the corresponding ranking over h.
Our next axiom, Pln, dictates that such a mapping between Σphq and the conditional preferences exists.
It will turn out (as a straightforward consequence of Theorem 4) that Σphq uniquely describes the DM’s
information structure. It partitions the subjective state space into equivalence classes of states that respect
the same ranking over the elements of h. With this in mind it becomes clear that subsequent partitions are
refinements of previous ones. To capture this idea more formally and reveal the DM’s preference contingent
on being in a state, we introduce the notion of assignments and strategic plans.
Definition. Given any collection of IHCPs, W Ď Z, and a history, h, an assignment is a function from
Σphq to W . Let AspW,hq be the set of all such assignments.
An assignment for W and h is function that maps to each sequence of consumption in Σphq and an
IHCP out of W . Then, a strategic plan is an assignment such that flexibility is no longer beneficial (beyond
choosing from Σphq, that is).
Definition. Given a history, h, and W Ď Z, a strategic plan is an assignment pW P AspW,hq, such thatď
σPΣphq
σppW pσqq „h
ď
σPΣphq
σW
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for all Σphq.
A strategic plan for W assigns to each sequence in Σphq a subset of the choice problem (i.e., an element
in the collection W ) in such a way that there is no additional benefit from flexibility. Since each element of
Σphq corresponds to a subjective state, then z “ pW pσq implies that z is the maximizing element of W in
the state that corresponds to σ.
[A5: Strategic Planning (Pln)]. For all h and all W “ tziuNi“1 Ă Z there exists a strategic plan over
W with respect to ěh.
Since flexibility is beneficial only when the DM wants to capitalize on learning distinct pieces of infor-
mation, axiom Pln dictates that the only information arriving is from the realization of her ranking of the
elements of h. Indeed, if there was some additional un-responsive information flow, the DM would have a
strict preference for flexibility, even after conditioning on her ranking over h.
The economic content of the axiom is precisely the following: the existence of a strategic plan implies
that everything the DM anticipates learning is described by her ranking over the elements of h, and that the
DM cannot obtain new information regarding elements in the exploration history (preferences over consumed
elements are stationary). That is, the axiom rules out (i) any learning (objective or subjective) which is not
the direct result of consumption, and (ii) learning models that allow for residual uncertainty over outcomes
that have been consumed.
It is also worth noting that although the axiom is existential, it is still falsifiable. Since strategic plan-
ning concerns only finite collections, W , of IHCPs, there is a finite number of assignments in AspW,hq.
Nonetheless, in light of the observability problems associated with existential axioms, we offer an alternative
axiomatization in Appendix C.
We also assume the DM is a consequentialist: she cares only about the path of consumption that actually
occurs. To impose this, we restrict that the continuation value for IHCPs after learning an event depends
only on the consumption in that event, and not what would have been consumed had a different event
occurred. Relating back to observables, this implies the maximizing elements of a strategic plan depend only
on the conditioning sequence and not on the menus offered following such sequences. The next axiom, closely
resembling the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference from standard choice theory, creates such a restriction.
[A6: Consequentialism (Csq)]. For all W,V Ď Z, if there exist strategic plans pW and pV , such that
pW pρq, pV pρq PW X V for some ρ P Σphq, then
ρppV pρqq Y
ď
σPΣphqzρ
σppW pσqq „h
ď
σPΣphq
σW
Csq states that if w is the maximal element in W conditional on choosing σ, and w is available in V ,
but some other alternative v was chosen, then v must be as good as w.
3.3.4 Interim Preferences
Using the language of strategic planning we can define the interim (i.e., state-dependent) preferences. That
is, the anticipated preference of the decision maker, conditional on having learned that her ranking over h is
the ranking corresponding to the sequence σ P Σphq, ěh|σ.
Definition. For each h and σ P Σphq, let ěh|σ be defined by z ěh|σ w if and only if there exists a strategic
plan p : Σphq Ñ tz, wu such that ppσq “ z.
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ta, bu “ a ta, cu tb, cu σ
a 9ąb 9ąc a a b ab
a 9ąc 9ąb a a c ac
b 9ąa 9ąc b a b ab
b 9ąc 9ąa b c b cb
c 9ąa 9ąb a c c cc
c 9ąb 9ąa b c c cc
Figure 7: Example of Σph1|σq
Although we do not have the language to directly observe the DM’s hypothetical preferences, we can
infer them by constructing ěh|σ, which is fully characterized by ě.
As the decision maker continues to consume, her interim preference will change. As such, we can consider
preferences of the form ěh1|σ where σ P Σphq and h1 Ą h. These preferences are defined in the same way as
ěh was defined from ě.
Definition. For each h, σ P Σphq and h1 Ą h let ěh1|σ be defined by
z ěh1|σ w ðñ h1z ěh|σ h1w
Since we will want also to define strategic plans from the point of view of interim preferences (to examine
the DM’s anticipated future learning conditional on past learning), it will be helpful to define Σph1|σq for
h1 Ą h and σ P Σphq. Σph1|σq is the subset of Σph1q that is consistent with σ. That is, defined by orders
that respect the ordering that generated σ and leaving out the redundant pairs. For example, if h “ ta, bu
and h1 “ ta, b, cu and σ “ a then Σph1|σq “ tab, ac, ccu, as shown in Figure 7.
Our first result, which is instrumental in constructing the LTC representation, provides the recursive
structure of the preferences. The conditional preference, ěh1|σ, inherits all of the structure imposed on ěh;
it satisfies all of the previous axioms.
Theorem 2. Let ě satisfy Hst. If ě satisfies Ord, Sta, Flx, Con, Pln, and Csq, then for each h,
σ P Σphq, and h Ď h1, ěh1|σ satisfies Ord, Sta, Flx, Con, Pln, and Csq.
This result allows us to obtain the branching, recursive representation. Even as the preferences change,
their structure –and so, the functional form of the representation– remains intact. Additionally, Theorem
2 indicates that there is nothing special about the ex-ante preference, ě, other than being associated with
a particular state space. If preferences were elicited at a later date, when some items had been consumed,
the resulting axiomatic structure and representation would be identical, but for a smaller (conditional) state
space.
Our last axiom imposes consistency on the way the DM’s preferences over outcomes (i.e., over X) can
change as she learns. In particular we impose that the value of a singleton is constant from an ex-ante point
of view. This implies that the value a decision maker places on an outcome a is the aggregated value she
places on a at each state which she considers possible. We want this to hold, not only at period zero, but
also for each interim preference, when looking forward. We also impose that there is a best and a worst
outcome that are ex-ante identified. This assumption is simply a convenient way to calibrate states to one
another.
18
Definition. a and a are universal best and worst elements, if ρ “Ś8 a and ρ “Ś8 a are such that, for
all z, w P Z and all feasible decision sequences given z: z´σρ ě z´σw ě z´σρ.
[A7: Singleton Recursivity (Rcv]. There exist universal best and worst element, a and a, such thatŚ8ta, au is order-dense in Z. Moreover,
ρ ěh|σ τ ðñ ρ ěh1|σ τ
ν ě pi ðñ ν ěh1|σ pi
for all σ P Σph2q such that h2 Ď hX h1, ρ, τ PŚ8X, and pi,ν, PŚ8ta, au.
Even though a decision maker expects to learn, a pre-determined stream of consumption offers no way to
capitalize on the new information. Hence, the DM’s value of a stream of singleton prizes is the aggregation
of her value in each state she still considers possible. Similarly, since the DM’s value over streams concerning
a and a are ex-ante known, her preference regarding such streams does not change, even when conditioned
on particular information.
Remark 1. In applications, when information is exogenous and we assume that the agent is learning as she
explores the different options, introducing flexibility is not necessary. In such environments we assume that
we have access to what the agent expects to learn and what action she will take after learning every bit of
information (i.e., the information structure is exogenous, and the actions are statistically optimal). Had the
agent needed to commit to an action stream (consumption, in our case), she would not be able to capitalize
on information she expects to learn as time progresses, and she would maximize her ex-ante expected utility.
Axiom Rcv states exactly that. When the agent needs to commit to a consumption stream, she calculates
her ex-ante utility. As modelers, in order to observe what the agent expects to learn, we need to offer her
flexibility so she can condition her future consumption on the different pieces of information she expects to
learn. This is a feature of most axiomatic learning models.
4 Learning Through Consumption Representation
In this section we present the main results of the paper. We start by providing the formal Learning Through
Consumption (LTC) functional form, formulate the representation result and, finally, present our uniqueness
result.
4.1 The Functional Form
The LTC representation was introduced as equation (LTC) in Section 3. We here give the formal definition.
Definition. The tuple, S “  S, tPphquhĎX(, is an LTC information structure if
S1. S Ď SOrpXq.
S2. For each h, Pphq is a partition of S.
S3. If h1 Ě h then Pph1q is a refinement of Pphq.
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S4. PpHq “ tSu and PpXq “ S.
Moreover,13 for P P Pphq and h1 Ą h, define Pph1|P q “ tP 1 P Pph1q : P 1 X P ‰ Hu, and P “ ŤhĎX Pphq.
Since ultimately states will be identified with rankings over X, the first restriction, S1 simply ensures
there are no duplicate states. Of course, it further restricts that states are strict orderings, but, this
assumption can be relaxed so that S permits weak orderings as described in Appendix B. Loosely speaking,
(S2) dictates that the DM has in mind some subjective state space, S, and that learning is always with
respect to S. Restriction (S3) dictates that the process of learning has perfect recall and that signals are
never contradictory. Finally, (S4) restricts attention to the case where everything can be learned and nothing
is known at the outset. This last restriction will be without loss of generality given our target representation,
since it merely entails a relabeling of states.
Note, the definition of an information structure is more general than the intuition provided in Section
2.2, in the sense that following every exploration history h, Pphq does not need to correspond to the natural
partition of S induced by all strict orderings over h. This is rectified by Theorem 4; its proof pins down the
structure of the partitions and shows it follows exactly the intuition provided earlier.
Given an LTC information structure, S, an LTC representation of ě is the pair pS,Uq, where U is a set of
functions with a desired recursive formulation and consistent with the information structure S. Specifically:
Definition. Let U “  tuP uPPP , tφh1|P uh1ĎX,PPP , F(, then we say pS,Uq is an LTC representation of ě
if S is an LTC information structure and
U1. uP : X Ñ R with uP paq ě uP paq ě uP paq for all a P X, F : R ˆ R Ñ R, strictly increasing and
continuous in its second component, and φh1|P : R|Pph
1|P q| Ñ R, strictly increasing for all P P Pphq for
all h Ď h1.
U2. UH|S : Z Ñ R represents ě and is defined recursively by
Uh1|P pzq “ φh1|P
`
max
iPMpzq
F puQpaiq, Uh1Yai|QpziqqQPPph1|P q
˘
,
such that the image of
Ś8ta, au is dense in the image of Z.
U3. uP “ φh1|P puQqQPPph1|P q.
U4. For any a, b P h and P P Pphq, uP paq ą uP pbq ðñ pa, bq P s for any s P P .
Restriction (U1) simply defines the nature of the functions involved and (along with (U2)) states that
F and φ aggregate preferences (and are strictly increasing). The most involved restriction, (U2), dictates
that this family of functions represents the preferences. This provides the particular recursive structure
to the preferences. To see how the recursive definition of Uh1|P can represent the primitive, observe, if
h1 “ h then Pph1|P q “ Pph|P q “ P , and the corresponding aggregator, φh1|P , is the identity mapping.
So for all h and P P Pphq, Uh|P pzq “ maxiPMpzq F puP paiq, UhYai|P pziqq. From this observation, we have
UH|Spzq “ maxiPMpzq F puSpaiq, Uai|Spziqq, where Uai|Spziq is defined by (U2). (U3) ensures that the DM,
given some residual uncertainty, evaluates consumption prizes as an aggregate of states she considers possible
given her current information. Moreover, the method of aggregation coincides with the process by which she
evaluates IHCPs. Lastly, (U4) dictates that the DM knows with certainty her ranking over prizes she has
13Elements P are cells of the partition Pphq of S. Cells of the finest partition PpXq are states in S.
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already consumed. Note, since for all s P P phq either pa, bq P s or pb, aq P s, (U4) requires all s P P phq to
agree on previously consumed outcomes.
4.2 Representation Theorem
With these definitions we can now state our representation theorem.
Theorem 3. The following are equivalent:
1. The preference ě satisfies Hst, Ord, Sta, Flx, Con, Pln, Csq, and Rcv.
2. There exists an LTC representation for ě.
4.3 The Uniqueness of the Information Structure
It is well known that the state space in Kreps [1979] is not unique, a hurdle overcome by Dekel et al. [2001]
by expanding the domain to include objective risk. In this section we show that, although we consider only
ordinal rankings over outcomes, we can identify the state space, S, in a meaningful way.
Theorem 4. Assume that pS,Uq and pS 1,U 1q are LTC representations of ě, then S “ S 1.
Our consumption space is finite, hence it is not necessary that U is unique in a cardinal sense. Nev-
ertheless, Theorem 4 states that the underlying uncertainty, including the partition associated with each
consumption history, can be uniquely recovered from ě. Since the notion of learning in this framework is
entirely ordinal, the underlying uncertainty is naturally associated with the possible orderings over X that
the DM considers possible ex-ante. It is a direct consequence of Theorems 3 and 4 that the unique set of
final states is some subset of SOrpXq and the partition induced by exploration history h is Σphq.
The intuition behind the identification is as follows. First, we resort to similar arguments as in Section 2.
Applying Theorem 1 allows us to identify the state space S as the uncertainty the DM considers following the
exploration of X in its entirety. With strategic planning, we identify, following every exploration history h,
the partition of S induced by the the strict orderings over h. At this point the additional structure of IHCPs
becomes necessary for the identification of the learning through consumption representation. Pln, in the
presence of flexibility at every period, allows us to define conditional preferences on a piece of information
(i.e., ěh|σ), and express how the DM expects to further learn conditional on learning that information. This
also provides the language to ensure the different identified state spaces are consistent with one another
in a recursive fashion. Specifically, we apply Rcv to make sure the aggregate behavior conditional on the
different states s P P P Pphq is identical to the behavior conditional on P (the more general condition being
U3).
Remark 2. In order to fully identify the information structure we need to observe preference for flexibility
after every exploration history. This is feasible even when restricted to IHCPs that exhibit no flexibility after
“sufficiently many” periods of time. Therefore, one can also consider finite horizon problems if willing to
forego recursivity (and thus Sta).
5 Related Literature
The literature on subjective states began with Kreps [1979]. In Kreps’ model, the set of future preference
profiles the DM considers possible is identified by examining her preferences over menus of consumption
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prizes. This framework has since been extended by Dekel et al. [2001] (DLR) to menus of lotteries, where
the unique set of cardinal utility functions can be identified. While these models are interpreted with a
dynamic component, there is only a single period of consumption.
Recently there have been papers that embed the DLR setup in dynamic settings. Krishna and Sadowski
[2014] provide an infinite horizon model where each period the DM’s utility is drawn from a subjective
distribution, depending on the current state. The model is not one of learning, and in particular, it is
not responsive; the information and period-by-period resolution of uncertainty is unrelated to the choices
made by the decision maker. Their representation has a recursive structure, lending itself to examine
the intertemporal tradeoff between future constraints and current period consumption. Our model allows
for similar contemplation, with the added intertemporal consideration regarding the tradeoff between future
information structures and current period consumption, as is standard in models of strategic experimentation.
Higashi et al. [2014] consider a dynamic extension of DLR with the different subjective states having
different discount factors. They axiomatize a recursive representation where subjective states evolve over
time according to history of past consumption. In their model, however, correlations across subjective states
(or, conditional preferences of conditional preferences, etc) are excluded, which is a clear distinction from
the methodological point presented here.
In a model of subjective learning, Dillenberger et al. [2014] examine a DM who has preferences over
menu-time pairs. This allows for the identification, not only of the set potential preference profiles considered
possible, but also of the way that the DM expects to learn over time. As in our model, at each period the
DM in Dillenberger et al. [2014] considers a state space that is a refinement of the previous periods’ state
spaces. However, in contrast to our model, the path of learning is not responsive, that is, does not depend
on the choices of the DM. In addition, their model is a static one and intertemporal considerations are not
studied.
The most closely related paper to responsive learning is Cooke [2015], considering a model in which the
agent has to rank consumption-menu pairs.14 Upon first stage consumption, the agent learns the cardinal
utility of the consumed element (thus learning is absolute), which helps to inform the choice out of the menu
in the second stage. This also implies that learning is partitional, similar to the model presented here. There
are two conceptual differences from this paper. First, in the set up Cooke presents, there is a single period
of learning. The conditioning event (that is, first period consumption) is explicitly modeled, rather than
identified via choices from menus. Second, learning is cardinal, rather than through comparisons as studied
here. We elaborate on these differences and their implications in Section D; the advantage of our approach
is that it facilitates the study of multiple periods of learning.
Models of rational inattention [Sims, 2003] share a common feature with models of responsive learning. In
both theories, agents make choices of consumption and of information acquisition. Nevertheless, in the former
the two choices are taken separately. In models of responsive learning, there is a single (joint) constraint; the
act of consumption directly determines how the agent is going to be further informed about the underlying
uncertainty. Ergin and Sarver [2010] and Dillenberger et al. [2015] provide a behavioral foundation to a class
of (introspective) learning models that include rational inattention with partitional information structures.
Case Based Decision Theory (CBDT), first introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1995], also investigates a
decision maker who evaluates her choices based on her experience. Like this paper, CBDT includes multistage
programming and learning from past actions (see chapters 5 and 7 of Gilboa and Schmeidler [2001]). Despite
14Hyogo [2007] raises a somewhat related question and provides an analysis in an environment similar to that of Cooke [2015],
resorting to an objective state space.
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these conceptual similarities, the formal frameworks differ significantly, as we stay within the confines of
(standard) utility maximization. Our notion of learning is based only on past consumption, while CBDT
considers hypothetical memories, where decision problems are compared according to an abstract notion of
similarity. Moreover, our recursive structure allows for a more direct analysis of the tradeoff between the
learning and consumption components of each choice.
A Proofs
A.1 Preliminary Results
Lemma 1. The decision maker has a weak preference for delaying choices. That is, for all z, w, v P Z, σ
feasible with respect to v and finite decision problems A,
v´σAtz Y wu ěh v´σtAz YAwu.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the decision makers Flx. That is, we know that the left hand
side is identically equal to v´σ
 
Atz Y wu YAtz Y wu(, which by flexibility and transitivity
v´σ
 
Atz Y wu YAtz Y wu( ěh v´σ Atzu YAtz Y wu( ěh v´σ Atzu YAtwu(,
which is identically equal to the right hand side. 
Lemma 2. For all σ P Σphq, and W Ă Z, there exists a strategic plan, pW : Σphq ÑW , such that pW pσq “ z
if any only if
σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρW „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW.
Proof. First, assume such a strategic plan exists. So we haveď
ρPΣphq
ρW ěh σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρW
ěh σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρppW pρqq
„h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW,
where both weak preferences are consequences of Flx and the indifference relation by Pln and our assump-
tion.
Now assume that
σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρW „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW. (A.1.8)
By Pln we know there exists some pW : Σphq ÑW such thatď
ρPΣphq
ρpW pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
W. (A.1.9)
Consider the collection V “ tW,wiuwiPW (In an effort to be clear, V “ tt
Ť
wPW wu, w1, w2, . . . wnu. It is
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immediate that
Ť
wPW w “
Ť
vPV v and so, utilizing this identity, we can rewrite (A.1.8) and (A.1.9):
σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρW „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV, (A.1.10)
ď
ρPΣphq
ρpW pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV. (A.1.11)
So, by (A.1.10) and (A.1.11) we satisfy the conditions for Csq and so:
σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpW pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV,
or, since
Ť
wPW w “
Ť
vPV v,
σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpW pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW.

Lemma 3. Let h Ă h1. The collection of functions, `pσ : Σph1|σq Ñ W ˘σPΣphq constitute a collection of
strategic plans for the corresponding preference relations
`
ěh1|σ
˘
σPΣphq if and only if the map
p :Σph1q ÝÑW
p :στ ÞÑ pσpτq
is a strategic plan for ěh1 . Where σ P Σphq and τ P Σph1|σq.
Proof. Let
`
pσ : Σph1|σq Ñ W
˘
σPΣphq constitute a collection of strategic plans for the corresponding prefer-
ence relations
`
ěh1|σ
˘
σPΣphq. Then we know that, for each σ P Σphq:ď
τPΣph1|σq
τpσpτq „h1|σ
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τW.
Using the definition of „h1|σ this is equivalent to
ph1zhq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τpσpτq „h|σ ph1zhq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τW. (A.1.12)
Hence, we know that there must exist two strategic plans (with respect the ěh) such that each side of
(A.1.12) gets assigned to σ in one of the two plans. Then, utilizing Csq to combine these strategic plans,
we know ď
σPΣphq
σph1zhq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τpσpτq „h
ď
σPΣphq
σph1zhq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τW. (A.1.13)
Since by Flx, the right-hand side of (A.1.13) is indifferent toď
σPΣphq
σph1zhq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
tτW, τpσpτqu,
Con implies ď
σPΣphq
σ
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τpσpτq „h1
ď
σPΣphq
σ
ď
τPΣph1|σq
tτW, τpσpτqu.
Again by Flx, ď
σPΣphq
σ
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τpσpτq „h1
ď
σPΣphq
σ
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τW,
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which is equivalent to ď
σPΣphq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
στpσpτq „h1
ď
σPΣphq
ď
τPΣph1|σq
στW.
And so, the specified map, p, is indeed a strategic plan for ěh1 . Each step is a bi-directional implication so
this proves the if and only if statement. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix some h, h1 Ą h and some σ P Σphq.
(Weak Order). That ěh1|σ is complete is immediate from the definition. Now assume that z ěh1|σ w
and w ěh1|σ v. Let Vˆ “ th1z, h1wu and V¯ “ th1w, h1vu. By the definition of ěh1|σ there exist strategic plans,
pVˆ : Σphq Ñ Vˆ , and pV¯ : Σphq Ñ V¯ , such that pVˆ pσq “ h1z and pV¯ pσq “ h1w.
Define V “ th1z, h1w, h1vu and let pV : Σphq Ñ V be the plan ensured by Pln. We claim that there
exits some strategic plan, qV , thereover, such that qV pσq “ h1z. There are three cases: Case 1: pV pσq “ h1z.
Then the claim holds. Case 2: pV pσq “ h1w, then since pVˆ pσq “ h1z we satisfy the conditions of Csq:
σh1z Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρth1z Y h1w Y h1vu, (A.2.1)
which defines the desired plan. Case 3: pˆpσq “ h1v, we can iterate the process used in case 2 to prove the
claim.
Finally, Pln ensures that there exists a plan pW over W “ th1z, h1vu. If pW pσq “ h1z then it cannot be
that h1v ąh|σ h1z and we are done. If pW pσq “ h1v, then the fact that pV pσq “ h1z and Csq provide a new
strategic plan qW pσq “ h1z, so again it cannot be that h1v ąh|σ h1z.
(Continuity). Let tznunPN be a convergent sequence in Z, with limit point z, such that zn ěh1|σ w for
all n and some w P Z. If it is the case that z ěh1|σ zn for some n P N, then by the transitivity of ěh1|σ we
have that z ěh1|σ w. So assume that for all n, zn ěh1|σ z. By Lemma 2 (and Csq) this implies that:
σh1zn Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρth1zn Y h1z Y h1wu „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρth1zn Y h1z Y h1wu.
Taking the limit, the continuity of ěh provides:
σh1z Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρth1z Y h1wu „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρth1z Y h1wu,
implying that z ěh1|σ w. Hence the contour sets of of ěh1|σ are closed.
(H-Stationarity). Let z ěh1|σ w, and A be a finite decision problem which is contained in h1 YŞ
σPnpzqYnpwq σ for some n. So, there exists a strategic plan, pV : Σphq Ñ V , with V “ th1z, h1wu, such that
zˆ “ σh1z Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρth1z, h1wu „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρth1z, h1wu “ wˆ.
Let m “ |σ| ` |h1|. Consider H “ hYŞσPrn`mspzˆqYrn`mspwˆq σ. For any a P supppAq we claim a P H.
There are three cases: (1) a P h, in which case we are done since h Ă H. (2) a P h1zh in which case
it is in the first m periods of zˆ and wˆ (by construction of the above plans you have to consume h1). (3)
a P ŞσPnpzqYnpwq σ in which case it is simply pushed back m periods (by construction of the above plans you
have to consume either the first n periods of z or the first n periods of w). Hence, by Sta we can interject
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A after n`m periods. Letting W “ th1z´nAzn, h1w´nAwnu this gives
σh1z´nAzn Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρW „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW,
so, by Lemma 2,
z´nAzn ěh1|σ w´nAwn.
The converse holds from the bi-directional implication of each step.
Now, for some v, and ρ feasible for v, let B be a finite decision problem with supppBq Ď h Y ρ. Call
V “ th1v´piBtz Y wu, h1v´σtBz Y Bwu. There exists a strategic plan pV : Σphq P V . Assume that
pV pσq “ h1v´piBtz Y wu. So
σh1v´piBtz Y wu Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV,
but by (2) of Sta we have
σh1v´pitBz YBwu Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV,
and so, v´piBtz Y wu ěh1|σ v´σtBz Y Bwu. Of course, if we assume pV pσq “ h1v´pitBz Y Bwu the same
argument holds. We have v´piBtz Y wu „h1|σ v´σtBz YBwu as desired.
(Preference for Flexibility). Assume, to the contrary, that there exists some v, z, w P Z, and pi
feasible for v such that v´piz ąh1|σ v´pipzYwq. Let V “ th1v´piz, h1v´pipzYwqu. Lemma 2 therefore implies
σh1v´piz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρV ąh σh1v´pipz Y wq Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρV,
an immediate contradiction to the DMs preference for Flx.
(Consistent Flexibility). Assume that, for some A Ď ŚNi“1 h1, finite pi such that h1 Y pi “ h2 and
f, g : AÑ Z we have ď
τPA
τpifpτq „h1|σ
ď
τPA
τpitfpτq Y gpτqu. (A.2.2)
Define, V “  h1ŤτPA τpifpτq, h1ŤτPA τpitfpτq Y gpτqu(. Then, by the definition of ěh1|σ, Csq, and lemma
2 we know that there exists some strategic plan pV : Σphq Ñ V such that
σh1
ď
τPA
τpifpτq Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV, (A.2.3)
σh1
ď
τPA
τpitfpτq Y gpτqu Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρV. (A.2.4)
Define the mapping fˆ : ΣphqAÑ Z as
ρτ ÞÑ
$’’&’’%
fpτq if ρ “ σ
fpτq if ρ ‰ σ and pV pρq “ ŤτPA τpifpτq
tfpτq Y gpτqu if ρ ‰ σ and pV pρq “ ŤτPA τpitfpτq Y gpτqu,
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and the mapping gˆ : ΣphqAÑ Z as
ρτ ÞÑ
$’’&’’%
tfpτq Y gpτqu if ρ “ σ
fpτq if ρ ‰ σ and pV pρq “ ŤτPA τpifpτq
tfpτq Y gpτqu if ρ ‰ σ and pV pρq “ ŤτPA τpitfpτq Y gpτqu.
Then, we can re-write the (A.2.3) and (A.2.4) asď
ρPΣphq
ρh1
ď
τPA
τpifˆpρτq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρh1
ď
τPA
τpitfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu, (A.2.5)
ď
ρPΣphq
ρh1
ď
τPA
τpigˆpρτq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρh1
ď
τPA
τpitfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu, (A.2.6)
so by Con (expanding h to h1 by eliminating h115)ď
ρPΣphq
ρ
ď
τPA
τpifˆpρτq „h1
ď
ρPΣphq
ρ
ď
τPA
τpitfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu,
ď
ρPΣphq
ρ
ď
τPA
τpigˆpρτq „h1
ď
ρPΣphq
ρ
ď
τPA
τpitfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu,
again by Con (expanding h1 to h2 by eliminating pi)ď
ρτPΣphqA
ρτ fˆpρτq „h2
ď
ρτPΣphqA
ρτtfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu, (A.2.7)
ď
ρτPΣphqA
ρτ gˆpρτq „h2
ď
ρτPΣphqA
ρτtfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu. (A.2.8)
Let Vˆ “  ŤτPA τfpτq,ŤτPA τtfpτq Y gpτqu( and Let pˆV : Σphqzσ Ñ Vˆ as
ρ ÞÑ
$&%
Ť
τPA τtfpτq Y gpτqu if pV pρq “
Ť
τPA τpitfpτq Y gpτquŤ
τPA τfpτq if pV pρq “
Ť
τPA τpifpτq.
Then, (A.2.7) and (A.2.8) are rewritten as
σ
ď
τPA
τfpτq Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpˆV pρq „h2
ď
ρPΣphq
ρVˆ ,
σ
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρpˆV pρq „h2
ď
ρPΣphq
ρVˆ .
Again by Con,
σh2
ď
τPA
τfpτq Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρh2pˆV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρh2Vˆ ,
σh2
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρh2pˆV pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρh2Vˆ .
By appealing to Lemma 1 we have
σh2
ď
τPA
τfpτq Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρh2pˆV pρq ěh
ď
ρPΣphq
ρ
 
h2
ď
τPA
τfpτq, h2
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu(, (A.2.9)
σh2
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρh2pˆV pρq ěh
ď
ρPΣphq
ρ
 
h2
ď
τPA
τfpτq, h2
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu(. (A.2.10)
The opposite weak preference preference to (A.2.9) and (A.2.10) are guaranteed by the DMs preference for
15This is permissible by defining 9f : ρ ÞÑ ŤτPA τpifˆpρτq, 9g likewise, and 9h : ρ ÞÑ ŤτPA τpitfˆpρτq Y gˆpρτqu. Then using Csq,
we can show that the antecedent for CF is satisfied (via 9f Y 9h for (A.2.5) and 9g Y 9h for (A.2.6).
27
Flx. Hence (A.2.9) and (A.2.10) hold with indifference and thus define a pair of strategic plans indicating
the conditional preference:
h2
ď
τPA
τfpτq „h|σ h2
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu,
or ď
τPA
τfpτq „h2|σ
ď
τPA
τtfpτq Y gpτqu,
as desired. The converse is also true by the same argument.
(Strategic Planning). We need only show that there exists a strategic plan for any 2 element subset
of Z: induction and the arguments used above can extend to any finite set. So take some z, w P Z. We want
to show that there exists some pˆtz,wu : Σph1|σq Ñ tz, wu such thatď
τPΣph1|σq
τ pˆtz,wupτq „h1|σ
ď
τPΣph1|σq
τtz Y wu.
From strategic planning (as applied to ěh1q, we know that there exists some ptz,wu : Σph1q Ñ tz, wu such
that ď
piPΣph1q
piptz,wuppiq „h1
ď
piPΣph1q
pitz Y wu.
Lemma 3 completes the claim.
(Consequentialism). For some finite W,V Ă Z let pˆW : Σph1|σq ÑW be a strategic plan (over ěh1|σ).
Assume that pˆW pρq P W X V . So, by lemma 3, there exists a strategic plan, pW : Σph1q Ñ W such that
pW pσρq “ pˆW pρq. Let pˆV : Σph1|σq Ñ V be some other strategic plan such that pˆV pρq P W X V . Again we
have an extension such that pV pσρq “ pˆV pρq.
So by Csq the function
p¯W ppiq “
$&%pV ppiq if pi “ σρpW ppiq if pi ‰ σρ
is also a strategic plan for W , according to ěh1 . Applying lemma 3 again provides the result.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Step-1: Recursive Structure on Consumption Streams. Let us begin by considering ěˆ, the restriction
of ě to degenerate IHCPs that assign pre-determined streams of consumption. Since the set of such IHCPs
is closed in in Z, continuity is inherited by ěˆ. Let Uˆ :
Ś8
i“1X Ñ R be the numerical representation of ěˆ.
Further, note that Rcv is equivalent on this domain to fully stationary preferences a la Koopmans [1960].
Thus, there exists a function u : X Ñ R and a strictly increasing function, continuous in its second argument
F : Rˆ RÑ R such that
Uˆpσq “ F rupσ1q, Uˆptσu8n“2qs. (A.3.1)
Step-2: From
Ś8
X to Z. Let U¯ be a continuous representation of ě. Since U¯ also representsŚ8
X, there exists some continuous, strictly increasing, ψ¯ : U¯ rŚ8Xs Ñ R such that ψ¯pU¯pσqq “ Uˆpσq.
Note that U¯ rŚ8Xs is compact by its closure in Z and the continuity of U¯ . So, according to Husseinov
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[2010] there exists a continuous, strictly increasing ψ : R Ñ R such that ψ¯pxq “ ψpxq for x P U¯ rŚ8Xs.
Define U “ ψ ˝ U¯ . U is a continuous representation of ě that coincides with (A.3.1) over elements of Ś8X.
For each x P R we can define the function Fx : RÑ R by Fxpyq “ F rx, ys. Notice that for any upaq, Fupaq
is continuous and strictly monotone over the interval rUpρq, Upρqs, where ρ “Ś8 a and ρ “Ś8 a. Hence,
FupaqrUpρq, Upρqs “ rUpaρq, Upaρqs, with identification via (A.3.1). Using these couriering functions, we
can define Ua : Z Ñ R for each a P X as
Ua : z ÞÑ F´1upaqpUpazqq.
which is well defined since Upazq P rUpaρq, Upaρqs by definition of universal outcomes, and hence in the
image of Fupaq.
The functional Ua represents ěa by construction. Indeed,
z ěa w ðñ az ě aw
ðñ Upazq ě Upawq
ðñ F´1upaqpUpazqq ě F´1upaqpUpawqq.
Note that for consumption streams, Uapσq “ Upσq by (A.3.1). Now given any Uh, we can define UhYa using
the same map,
UhYa : z ÞÑ F´1upaqpUhpazqq,
to inductively define all hypothetical preferences. Note, of course, that we have:
Uhpazq “ F rupaq, UhYapzqs. (A.3.2)
Notice that if a P h then UhYa “ Uh. To see this assume that for some z, Uhpzq ą UhYapzq. Now by
the density of streams of universal outcomes, there exists some σ such that Uhpzq ą Uhpσq “ UhYapσq ą
UhYapzq. But this is a direct contradiction of Sta.
Step-3: The existence of a Krepsian State Space. Let Σˆphq Ď Σphq denote the set such that ěh|σ is
a non-trivial preference. Theorem 2 states that there for each σ P Σˆphq the corresponding preference relation
ěh|σ is a continuous weak order, and therefore representable by a continuous value function Uh|σ : Z ÝÑ R.
We claim that these states form a Krepsian state space.
Lemma 4. Let z “ pai, ziqiPMpzq be a choice problem and σ P Σphq. There exists some i P Mpzq such that
pai, ziq „h|σ z.
Proof. We first claim that the lemma holds if z is a finite set. By identifying z as a collection of singleton
menus W “ ttpai, ziqu | i P Mpzqu, the Strategic Planning axiom ensures that there exist paσi , zσi q P z,
σ P Σphq such that ď
σPΣphq
σtpaσi , zσi qu „h
ď
σPΣphq
σz.
By Lemma 2,
σtpaσi , zσi qu Y
ď
ρPΣphq,ρ‰σ
ρz „h
ď
σPΣphq
σz,
which implies that there exists a strategic plan for U “ tz, tpaσi , zσi quu such that tpaσi , zσi qu is assigned to
σ. By definition of ěh|σ, paσi , zσi q ěh|σ z. On the other hand, by Preference for flexibility, z ěh|σ paσi , zσi q.
Hence, we have paσi , zσi q „h|σ z, as desired.
Take any z P Z. Since Z is metrizable with the Hausdorff metric, there exists a sequence zn P Z such that
zn Ñ z and zn is a finite subset of z. By the above claim, there exists pan, wnq P zn such that zn „h pan, wnq.
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Since X ˆZ is compact, without loss of generality, assume that pan, wnq converges to some point pa,wq. By
continuity, z „h pa,wq with pa,wq P z. This completes the proof. ‹
By the consequence of Lemma 4,
Uh|σpzq “ max
iPMpzq
Uh|σpaiziq. (A.3.3)
For any z P Z define
fhpzq “ tw P Z|z ěh|σ w,@σ P Σˆphqu.
The set fhpzq returns the intersections of the lower contour sets of each state induced preference. We now
claim that w P fhpzq if and only if z „h z Y w. This is the characterization of the dominance relation in
Kreps [1979]:
w P fhpzq ðñď
σPΣˆphq
σz „h
ď
σPΣˆphq
σtz Y wu ðñ
z „h tz Y wu,
where the first implication follows from the definition of ěh|σ and Csq, and the second implication from
Sta.
From here we can follow Kreps’ proof. Now define φh : RΣˆphq Ñ R as any strictly increasing function
that extends the map
`
Uh|σpzq
˘
σPΣˆphq ÞÑ Uhpzq. This is well defined since
`
Uh|σpzq
˘
σPΣˆphq “
`
Uh|σpwq
˘
σPΣˆphq
implies that w P fhpzq and z P fhpzq which in turn implies that z „h z Y w „h w. Likewise, if`
Uh|σpzq
˘
σPΣˆphq ě
`
Uh|σpwq
˘
σPΣˆphq with some strict equality then w P fhpzq but z R fhpwq implying
z „h z Y w ąh w. Plugging (A.3.3) into the aggregator we have
Uhpzq “ φh
`
max
iPMpzq
Uh|σpai, ziqσPΣˆphq
˘
. (A.3.4)
Step-4: States within States. Now Theorem 2 tells us that ěh|σ obeys the same set of axioms as ě.
Therefore, if the above claim holds, and Uh|σ represents some ěh|σ then we can repeat the previous steps
(1-3) to obtain the state dependent version of equation (A.3.2), which implies
Uh|σpazq “ Fσruσpaq, UhYa|σpzqs,
From Rcv we know that it is WLOG that Fσ “ F for all σ. Assume that this was not the case, so that
for some σ, 9U : z ÞÑ max
iPMpzq
F puσpaiq, 9Upziqq does not represent ěh|σ. So there must be some z and w such
that z ěh|σ w but 9Upwq ą 9Upzq. By Sta we have that σ1z ěh|σ σ1w. Also, by the strict increasingness of
F we have that 9Upσ1wq ą 9Upσ1zq. Therefore, by the continuity of ěh|σ and by Rcv we can find sequences
of universal outcome, pi and τ such that pi ěh|σ z ěh|σ w ěh|σ τ and 9Upσ1τ q ą 9Upσ1piq, and hence
9Upτ q ą 9Uppiq.
But this contradicts the invariance of preferences regarding universal streams. Indeed, we choose some
common normalization, over a¯ and a, then it is clear that 9U ” U on such a domain. But pi ěh|σ τ ðñ
pi ě τ , which is a contradiction.
This provides,
Uhpzq “ φh
`pUh|σpzqqσPΣphq˘ “ φh` max
iPMpzq
F ruσpaiq, UhYai|σpziqsσPΣphq
˘
.
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Moreover, we can repeat this entire exercise starting with the conditional preferences, retaining any nor-
malizations. Note we use the definition of a conditional strategic plan (i.e., over sequences in Σph1|σq).
Finally,
Uh1|σpzq “ φh1|σ
`pUh1|τ pzqqτPΣph1|σq˘ “ φh1|σ` max
iPMpzq
F ruτ paiq, Uh1Yai|τ pziqsτPΣph1|σq
˘
. (A.3.5)
This is the representation we are after.
Step-5: Properties of the State Space. It is immediate that the tuple, S “ tΣˆpXq, tΣˆphquhĎXu
satisfies properties (S1) (by the identification of ΣˆpXq and SOrpXq), (S2), (S3), and (S4), and so, is a
LTC information structure. Let Σ “ ŤhĎX Σˆphq. Moreover, it can be directly verified from (A.3.5) that
U “  tuσuσPΣ, tφh1|σuh1ĎX,σPΣ, F( satisfies (U1) and (U2). (U3) is an immediate consequence of Rcv (most
easily seen with the normalization uσpaq “ 0 and F px, 0q “ x). Lastly, the following Lemma provides (U4).
By the construction of S, it is clear that all s P P phq ” Σˆphq agree on the ranking over h. The aggregation
property, (U3), therefore establishes property (U4).
So,
! 
ΣˆpXq, tΣˆphquhĎX
(
,
 tuσuσPΣ, tφh1|σuh1ĎX,σPΣ, F() constitutes an LTC representation of ě as de-
sired.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Let pS “  S, tPphquhĎX(,Uq and pS 1 “  S1, tP 1phquhĎX(,U 1q represent ě. A direct application of Theorem
1 (to the restriction of ěX to menus of sequences) shows S “ S1.
It remains to show that Pphq “ P 1phq for all h Ă X. Towards a contradiction, assume this was not the
case: for some h Ă X and P P Pphq, P Ę P 1 for all P 1 P P 1phq. As in the construction in Theorem 1, let
ΓpXq denote the set of all pairs of distinct elements of X, enumerated as γ1 . . . γp|X|2 q. For any s P S define
σs P Xp|X|2 q by
σsn “ argmax
bPγn
uspbq (A.4.1)
Define the mapping k : P ÞÑ tσs|s P P u. Now, consider the IHCPs
z “
ď
PPPphq
pXzhqkpP qa,
w “
ď
P 1PP 1phq
pXzhqk1pP 1qa.
Using the representation, it is clear P P Pphq Uh|P pzq ą Uh|P pwq, and hence UHphtzYwuq ą UHphwq. But for
every P 1 P P 1phq, we have by construction that U 1h|P 1phzYhwq “ U 1h|P 1phwq, and therefore, U 1HphtzYwuq “
U 1Hphwq, a contradiction to their joint representation.
B Strategic Plans over Weak Rankings
The analysis by which strategic planning separates the preference ordering over the history via the construc-
tion of Σphq is not restricted to strict orderings. Although the actual sequences that identify each state
may become very long they are ensured to exist and be finite. Explicitly, we are assuming that each of the
preference ordering satisfies Ord and Sta. This assumption is substantiated by Theorem 2, which states
that if a strategic plan exists over such a Σphq exists, the the resulting conditional preferences will inherit
those axioms.
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We will first examine the case with |h| “ 2 to gain intuition then show how this can be extended. For
this section let m denote the universally worst outcome. If h “ ta, bu, then there are 3 states: a 9ąb, a 9„b,
and b 9ąa.
The complication is creating a sequence that is optimal when the DM strictly prefers a to b but not
optimal when the preference is weak. This of course cannot be simply a choice of a since indifference does
not rule out this choice as optimal. However, by using a longer sequence and the universal worst outcome
we can find the desired sequences. Consider,
1: a 9ąb aa, aa, . . . , aw
2: a 9„b ab, ab, . . . , ab
3: b 9ąa bb, bb, . . . , bw
Where “. . .” denote the repetition of the previous consumption entries. If the decision maker is indifferent,
it is clear that 2 is the unique optimal choice as it is the only sequence to avoid consumption of m. Moreover,
for sufficiently long repetitions, 1 becomes the unique choice for a DM who prefers a to b strictly, since a
one time consumption of m is better than the repeated consumption of b. To see why, note thatOrd (in
particular, continuity with respect to the product topology) implies tail robustness. We say a preference is
tail robust if for all ρ, τ P Ś8X, ρ ą τ implies that there exists some n P N such that ρnm ą τ . This is
a straightforward application of continuity and the fact that ρnm Ñ ρ as n Ñ 8. Moreover, Sta implies
that if aaaa . . . ą bbbb . . . then aaaa . . . ą abab . . . ą bbbb . . .. These two facts ensure that for some finite
repetition, the above sequences will produce a strategic plan.
This intuition is extendable to the general case. To outline how, we show the case with h “ ta, b, cu.
There are 13 weak orderings:
1: a 9ąb 9ąc aab, aab, . . . , wab aab, aab, . . . , awb aab, aab, . . . , aaw
2: a 9ąc 9ąb aac, aac, . . . , wac aac, aac, . . . , awc aac, aac, . . . , aaw
3: b 9ąa 9ąc bab, bab, . . . , wab bab, bab, . . . , bwb bab, bab, . . . , baw
4: b 9ąc 9ąa bcb, bcb, . . . , wcb bcb, bcb, . . . , bwb bcb, bcb, . . . , bcw
5: c 9ąa 9ąb acc, acc, . . . , wcc acc, acc, . . . , awc acc, acc, . . . , acw
6: c 9ąb 9ąa bcc, bcc, . . . , wcc bcc, bcc, . . . , bwc bcc, bcc, . . . , bcw
7: a 9ąb 9„c aab, aab, . . . , wab aab, aab, . . . , awb aab, aac, . . . , aab
8: b 9ąa 9„c bab, bab, . . . , wab bab, bcb, . . . , bab bab, bab, . . . , baw
9: c 9ąa 9„b acc, bcc, . . . , acc acc, acc, . . . , awc acc, acc, . . . , acw
10: a 9„b 9ąc aab, bab, . . . , aab aab, aab, . . . , awb aab, aab, . . . , aaw
11: a 9„c 9ąb aac, aac, . . . , wac aac, acc, . . . , aac aac, aac, . . . , aaw
12: b 9„c 9ąa bcb, bcb, . . . , wcb bcb, bcb, . . . , bwb bcb, bcc, . . . , bcb
13: a 9„b 9„c aab, bab, . . . , aab aac, acc, . . . , aac aac, aab, . . . , aac
One only needs to break up each pairwise distinct aspect of different preference relations into “blocks”
that imitate the |h| “ 2 case. I.e., the first block separates strict and weak indifference between a and b the
second between a and c and finally between a and c. Since DMs preferences (over IHCPs) are stationary
(since we consume only elements in the exploration history and universal outcomes) this process separates
all the weak preference relations from one another.
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C The Dominance Relation Behind Strategic Planning
In this section we provide equivalent statements for Pln, which postulates the existence of a strategic plan
given any history. Similar planning type axioms, which posit the existence of an optimal way to reduce
flexibility, have have played similar roles (constructing subjective dynamic information structures) in the
previous work such as Dillenberger et al. [2014] and the supplementary appendix to Krishna and Sadowski
[2014]. This section, in addition to providing alternative axioms in our framework, sheds light on the
connection between planning axioms and dominance axioms such as those used in Kreps [1979] and implied
by the independence axiom in Dekel et al. [2001].
In this section we provide equivalent statements for Pln, which postulates the existence of a strategic
plan given any history. This section, in addition to providing alternative axioms in our framework, sheds
light on the connection between planning axioms and dominance axioms such as those used in Kreps [1979]
and (implied by the independence axiom) in Dekel et al. [2001].
C.1 The Dominance Relation
Definition. Set z, w P Z. Then we say that z σ-dominates w, denoted z ěσ w, if and only if,
σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρ
`
z Y w˘ ěh σw Y ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρ
`
z Y w˘.
We say that z σ-dominates w when the assignment is preferred in the absence of any cross state hedging.
Hedging concerns are removed by ensuring that z and w can be chosen in any other “state.”
Definition. Set p P As(W,h). Then we say that p is in the envelope of W if ppσq σ-dominates w for all
w PW and σ P Σphq.
An assignment is in the envelope of W if each assignment is σ-dominance maximal element of the
collection; it is the maximal assignment according to dominance. Without further restrictions, the envelope
of a collection need not exist. The following two restrictions will imply that (i) the envelope of any finite W
exists, and (ii) an assignment in the envelope is a strategic plan for W . Moreover, since σ-dominance does
not depend on the assignment, these restrictions will also guarantee that Csq is satisfied.
For these claims to hold, we need to first ensure that σ-dominance is a weak order. Since the completeness
of ěσ is inherited by the completeness of ě, we need only to impose transitivity.
[A8: σ-Transitivity (σ-Trv)]. For all σ P Σphq, ěσ, is transitive.
While σ-Trvis written in terms of the auxiliary relation ěσ, it is straight forward to write as a restriction
on our primitive ě. Axiom σ-Trv, has the following immediate consequence:
Lemma 5. If ě is a weak order that satisfies σ-Trv, then ěσ is a weak order over Z.
The next axiom is a modularity condition, ensuring the maximal element according to the dominance
relation (i.e., maximal for all σ) is a strategic plan.
[A9: Modularity (Mod)]. For all finite W and p P AspW,hq, p is in the envelope of W if and only ifď
ρPΣphq
ρpppρqq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW.
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Modularity characterizes preferences for flexibility entirely in terms of dominance: flexibility is of no
benefit unless it can improves the dominance of its assignments. This is essentially the content behind Pln
(i.e., that flexibility can be muted) and Csq (that plans are evaluated without hedging concerns). The
next result states that in Theorem 3, our main representation result, Pln and Csq could be replaced with
σ-Trvand Mod.
Theorem 5. If the preference ě satisfies Hst, Ord, Sta, Flx, and Con, then the following are equivalent:
1. ě satisfies Pln and Csq;
2. ě satisfies σ-Trvand Mod.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. (2 ñ Strategic Planning) Fix h and finite W . By Lemma 5 the σ-dominance relation induces a
weak ordering, ěσ, over Z for each each σ P Σphq. So, by the finiteness of W there is a maximal element (in
W ) for each σ: call this wσ. Define the assignment: p¯ : σ ÞÑ wσ.
We claim that p¯ is a strategic plan. By construction p¯ is in the envelope of W . Therefore, by applying
Axiom Modwe have ď
ρPΣphq
ρppρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW.
(2 ñ Consequentialism) Let W,V Ď Z, and strategic plans pW and pV , such that pW pσq, pV pσq P
V XW for some σ P Σphq. Define w “ pW pσq and v “ pV pσq. Sinceď
ρPΣphq
ρpW pρq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW,
Axiom Mod implies that pW is in the envelope of W . Likewise, pV in the envelope of V . So, by definition
v ěσ z for all z P V , hence v ěσ w. Lastly, this implies that pˆW , defined by
pˆW ppiq “
$&%v if pi “ σpW ppiq if pi ‰ σ,
is in the envelope of W . Applying Axiom Mod again:
σpV pρq Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρppW pσqq „h
ď
ρPΣphq
ρW,
so Csq holds.
(1 ñ σ-Transitivity). Claim: z ěσ w if and only if z ěh|σ w. Indeed, letting p P As({z,w},h) be a
strategic plan we have:
z ěh|σ w ðñ σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρppρq ěh σw Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρppρq (C.2.1)
ðñ σz Y
ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρ
`
z Y w˘ ěh σw Y ď
ρPΣphqzσ
ρ
`
z Y w˘ (C.2.2)
ðñ z ěσ w, (C.2.3)
where the equivalence in (C.2.1) invokes Csq, and between (C.2.1) and (C.2.2) invokes Lemma 2. Given the
claim, the transitivity of ěh|σ (by Theorem 2) directly implies the transitivity of ěσ.
(1 ñ Modularity). Fix p P AspW,hq with p in the envelope of W . By Strategic planning there exists
strategic plan pW . By the definition of the envelope of W , ppσq ěσ w for all w P W , which by the claim
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implies ppσq ěh|σ w for all w P W , in particular, ppσq ěh|σ pW pσq. By Csq we have that p is a SP: the
indifference condition of Axiom Mod holds. The opposite direction is near identical and thus omitted. 
D An Additive Representation
We conclude with a brief discussion regarding the possibility of introducing additive aggregators to the
LTC representation. We believe it is possible to adapt the use of strategic planning and obtain an additive
representation result for a set up including lotteries (as in Dekel et al. [2001]).16 A more particular model
with objective risk may be more tractable for some applications. However, while some axioms may be
rewritten or weakened, it seems that the main axioms will be formulated in a similar way as in the current
model. In that respect, it does not add much to the message of the paper and the identification techniques.
Moreover, we argue there is an interpretational issue underlying the framework needed for such an exercise.
As in Dekel et al. [2001], Krishna and Sadowski [2014], in order to obtain an additive representation,
we must consider a richer structure of choice objects and allow for lotteries. In this case, learning ordinally
through comparisons between elements in the history, is not “compatible” with learning a cardinal utility
function. That is, if learning takes place only through the consumption of outcomes, it is not possible that
two different states would correspond to two different utility functions over lotteries that rank consumption
elements in the same way. Note that this does not mean one can not identify the von Neumann–Morgenstern
state dependent utility, but rather that no two states could share the same ordinal ranking. As such, the
DM cannot be certain of her ordinal ranking over outcomes, but be unsure of her risk preferences. We find
this somewhat unnatural.
A possible way to avoid this interpretational quagmire is to allow for consumption of, and thus compar-
isons between, lotteries. The DM considers consumption of lotteries ex-ante and she believes she will be
able to compare such lotteries after experiencing them. In this case, learning different cardinal utilities (that
agree on the rankings of extreme points) is possible. However, the information structure will always pertain
to a finite set of elements (in a world of a continuum). More importantly, comparison of lotteries seems as
unnatural as the problem we are trying to rectify. Since histories stand for experience, it seems more natural
comparing between outcomes of lotteries, than comparing between lotteries themselves.
The origin of these interpretational difficulties is our reliance on strategic planning to identify conditional
preferences. Strategic planning states that we can reduce everything the decision maker has learned to a
finite series of pairwise choices. But, to identify a cardinal preference, an infinite number of pairwise choices
is required. Notice that this issue does not arise in Cooke [2015]. Strategic planning is not necessary in that
environment because, with two periods (where flexibility exists only in the second period), the DM’s choice
out of a menu in never explicitly modeled –therefore, neither is the resolution of the learning process. It
is only when moving from identifying the set of preferences the DM might learn (i.e., Pphq) to identifying
the preferences conditional on having learned a particular piece of information (i.e., Pph|P q) that strategic
planning is necessary.
16The proof would go roughly in the following line. We can consider a richer environment than that adopted in this paper,
similar to that in Gul and Pesendorfer [2004]. With similar techniques we can obtain a result like in Theorem 3. For every
exploration history h, every IHCP z is associated with Uhpzq and the vector
`
Uh|σpzq
˘
σPΣphq. So an additive representation
exists if there is a vector ppσqσPΣphq such that Uhpzq “
ř
σPΣphq ppσqUh|σpzq. An infinite dimensional version of Farkas Lemma
could be applied and, given an independence axiom, similar arguments as in Seo [2009] guarantee that such a representation
exists. One still has to show that the weights aggregate properly across histories, but this holds due to the aggregation property
(U3) of the LTC functional form, which is implied by Rcv.
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